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ABSTRACT
These days, most data is digitized and processed in various ways by computers. In
the past, computer owners were free to process data as desired and to observe the
inputted data as well as the interim results. However, the unrestricted processing
of data and accessing of interim results even by computer users is associated with
an increasing number of adverse events. These adverse events often occur when
sensitive data such as personal or confidential business information must be
handled by two or more parties, such as in the case of e-Discovery, used in legal
proceedings, or epidemiologic studies. To solve this problem, providers encrypt
data, and the owner of the computer performs decoding in the memory for
encrypted data. The computer owner can be limited to performing only certain
processing of data and to observing only the final results. As an implementation
that uses existing technology to realize this solution, the processing of data
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contained in a smart card was considered, but such an implementation would not
be practical due to issues related to computer capacity and processing speed.
Accordingly, the authors present the concept of PC-based High Grade AntiTamper Equipment (HiGATE), which allows data to be handled without
revealing the data content to administrators or users. To verify this concept, an eDiscovery application on a prototype was executed and the results are reported
here.
Keyword: Anti-Tamper, e-Discovery, Bitlocker, APIHook
1. INTRODUCTION
These days, most data is digitized and processed in various ways by computers. In
the past, computer owners were permitted to process data as desired and to
observe the inputted data and the interim results. However, the unrestricted
processing of data and accessing of interim results even by computer users is
associated with an increasing number of adverse events. These adverse events
often occur when sensitive data such as personal or confidential business
information must be handled by two or more parties, such as in the following
cases.
1. (1) Epidemiologic studies: Epidemiologic studies often seek to compare
data concerning (a) physical loads, such as the exposure dosage of
individuals at a workplace and (b) the incidence of illnesses, such as
cancer, obtained from hospitals and field studies for investigating
correlations with various factors. However, when this data is transferred
to a partner or third party and the usual processing is performed, personal
information contained in the inputted data or interim results may be
revealed to the person using the computer to perform the data processing.
This is a problematic situation from the standpoint of protecting personal
information. Consequently, at present, the exchange of this data is not
possible, thereby creating a problem in that epidemiologic studies cannot
be used to improve the health of citizens. As a current solution, (i) data
encrypted by the original owner may be transferred to a partner or third
party, and (ii) the partner or third party may input the encrypted data into
a computer, which after the data is decrypted, implements certain
processing and outputs only correlation values, so that the interim results
and other sensitive information are not accessible to even the computer
user.
2. (2) e-Discovery: Japanese companies are often involved in e-Discovery
performed for US civil court. Prior to preceding to trial in a US civil court
in both Japanese and US civil courts the defendant and the plaintiff sides
mutually disclose electronic evidence. At this time, if electronic
documentary evidence containing a keyword or other security
mechanism by the plaintiff side exists but is not disclosed, the trial will be
severely disadvantaged. Conversely, if all accumulated electronic data is
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disclosed unconditionally, personal information may be revealed and
critical business information may be leaked unnecessarily to a rival
plaintiff. For this reason, electronic documents may be partially sanitized
[4]. The plaintiff side receiving the sanitized electronic documents may
want to verify with a computer that the sanitized portions do not contain
keywords, but if viewing the sanitized portions is freely permitted, the
defendant-side secrets would be revealed unfairly. To resolve these
problems, computer processing may also determine whether the sanitized
portions contain keywords, but other processing such as deciphering the
sanitized portions should not be performed, and the interim results should
not be revealed.
Common to the solutions of these problems is that the computer owner performs
only specific processing of the data and is able to observe only the final results.
One conceivable means to realize such a solution is to use tamper-resistant
equipment that prevents the owner from changing the processing or accessing
interim results. Smart cards (also known as IC cards) are typically used as the
tamper-resistant equipment. A smart card contains a secret key that is not
revealed, even to the user, and public key encryption, which is generally used to
implement digital signatures.
Smart cards, however, have the problems of slow processing speed, small
memory, and are difficult for an average person to program using an ordinary
computer language. Thus, we developed a system that overcomes these problems
by improving the PC hardware and software. This new system, configured from
PC-based hardware and from software such as the boot control function (BCF)
[11] previously developed by the authors, is known as High Grade Anti-Tamper
Equipment (HiGATE).
This paper presents the HiGATE concept, and reports the results of the
application of a prototype to e-Discovery.
With the heightened interest in the handling of personal and confidential
information, the range of applications for HiGATE is expected to increase in the
future.
To achieve the same objective, the use of an encryption protocol has also been
envisioned, but such an approach would only be suitable for an extremely narrow
range of applications and could not be applied to the types of problems
encountered here. Approaches similar to that used in our research, that is,
preventing even a computer user from freely processing data and accessing
interim results, have not been reported in other studies.
2 OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED SYSTEM
2.1 HiGATE Requirements
HiGATE has the following five requirements.
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1. A tamper-resistant area exists that even the owner cannot access.
2. A memory with sufficient capacity for calculations is provided
3. Arithmetic computations are processed at a fast speed.
4. Programming by a trusted third-party, rather than the owner, is permitted.
5. The equipment is easy to realization.
A smart card is an example of a device capable of satisfying the first requirement
above. The use of a smart card, however, has the following two problems. First of
all, the processing capacity presents a problem, especially in cases such as eDiscovery, where large quantities of data are handled and processing must be
done within a limited timeframe. Secondly, programming a smart card requires
the use of special techniques such as micro-programming, and an ordinary person
would not be able to program a smart card as desired. Thus, the development of
HiGATE, which satisfies the above five requirements, was needed for
applications not suitable for smart cards.
2.2 Measures for Satisfying the Requirements
(Requirement 1)
The HiGATE functions necessary to satisfy requirement 1 are listed below:
① Hardware function
Capability to prove that the equipment case has not been opened
② Software functions
1. Boot control function for application programs
2. Encryption function for entire hard disk (HDD)
3. Arithmetic processing function
4. File delete function that leaves intact the inputted data for calculations
and the interim results.
These functions are described in detail in Section 3.
(Requirements 2, 3, 4 and 5)
Requirements 2, 3, 4 and 5 can be implemented automatically through the process
of PC-based development. In other words, PC-based development provides the
advantages of fast I/O throughput and computational speeds, the capability to
accumulate large quantities of data, and the ability to use a common programming
language such as C or JAVA instead of a special programming language.
Moreover, PC-based development facilitates installation since there is no
significant need for special equipment. In this case, Windows, with which the
authors have much experience, was chosen as the OS.
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3. HIGATE CONFIGURATION
3.1 Prerequisites
(Prerequisite 1) The BIOS and OS are running properly.
(Prerequisite 2) Unauthorized actions are not performed when implementing the
HiGATE settings.
(Prerequisite 3) HiGATE does not contain an unauthorized program.
HiGATE operates under the abovementioned conditions.
3.2 Possible Unauthorized Actions
There are three conceivable methods for attacking HiGATE, and these are listed
below:
1. (Unauthorized action 1) Forcible opening of the case and extraction of
information from the memory
2. (Unauthorized action 2) Removal of the HiGATE HDD and connection
to another PC to extract the HiGATE internal data and programs, etc.
3. (Unauthorized action 3) Activation of an unauthorized program to
modify other programs or steal information.
3.3 Functions to Protect Against Unauthorized Actions
(Protection 1) Provide proof that the case has not been opened.
As in the description of unauthorized action 1, it is conceivable that the case can
be opened and the memory contents stolen. Accordingly, it is important to prevent
the case from being opened. This protection may be realized by the following two
methods.
1. Cause the power supply or other essential device to shut off and the
memory contents to disappear if the case is forcibly opened. Methods for
switching off the power supply include: (a) microswitch-based detection
of the case opening, (b) detection via a lead switch and a magnet on the
case cover, and (c) optical detection of the lid opening.
2. Provide a seal that clearly indicates whether the case has been opened.
Tamper-resistant labels are an existing technology. If a tamper-resistant
label is peeled off, an indication that the case has been opened remains.
By making the data contained in the HiGATE lose its effectiveness when
a seal is cut and peeled off, unauthorized actions by the user can be
prevented.
Here, we decided to use method (2), which is easily achieved. In the future, a
combination of methods (1) and (2) will enable enhanced safety.
(Protection 2) HDD encryption
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HDD encryption is implemented to prevent the HDD used in the HiGATE from
being removed or connected to another PC and to prevent the HDD contents from
being modified or extracted as described in unauthorized action 2. An existing
technology is the BitLocker function which is provided only in Windows Vista
Enterprise and Windows Vista Ultimate editions. Because Windows Vista
Enterprise is only sold through volume licensing, we installed Windows Vista
Ultimate as the HiGATE OS.
(Protection 3) Boot control (BCF/Vista)
As described in unauthorized action 3, it is conceivable that an unauthorized
program can be activated to modify other programs and steal information.
BCF/Vista [11] is an existing technology developed by the authors to prevent
such unauthorized actions. The BCF/Vista function is described in detail in
Section 3.4.
Other functions include the file delete and arithmetic processing functions. The
file delete function deletes data from the HDD used with HiGATE. This function
operates so that the HiGATE user does not leave behind any data after the usage
of that data has been completed. The HiGATE system handles data which even
the user is not permitted to view. Accordingly, the continuous retention of data in
the user’s HiGATE system will lead to an unauthorized action. The arithmetic
processing function is used in different ways depending on the application, and
can be developed freely by the program developer. Additionally, unauthorized
actions through the skillful use of the keyboard are conceivable, but can be
avoided through the use of the device driver installation control function in
Windows Vista Ultimate.
3.4 BCF/Vista
BCF/Vista was a part of the development of the Dig-Force [2][3] digital forensic
system.
BCF/Vista computes hash values for programs that are activated during setup,
registers these hash values in a white list, and digitally signs the entire white list.
The OS and then BCF/Vista are set to start next. After they are running, the
BCF/Vista function computes hash values for application programs as they try to
start up, and after confirming the validity of the previously registered white list by
signature verification, the computed hash value is compared to the hash value in
the white list. If the value is the same as the registered hash value, the program
starts, but if not registered, APIHook is used to prevent the program from starting.
As a result, even if an unauthorized program attempts to start up, if Prerequisite 1
that “the BIOS and OS are running properly,” has been established, the
unauthorized program can be prevented from running. For further details
regarding the BCF/Vista function, refer to reference document [11].

26

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 5(2)
3.5 Functional Configuration
Providing the hardware function and the four software functions listed in Section
2.2 enables a tamper-resistant area to be realized to protect the OS and the
arithmetic processing function residing on the HDD, as well as the keys, data,
etc., residing in memory. Accordingly, an arithmetic processing program created
by a program developer and placed in the tamper-resistant area can be executed
correctly by the HiGATE system without any unauthorized actions. The HiGATE
functional configuration is shown in Figure 1 and smart card and HiGATE
functions are compared in Tables 1 and 2.
HiGATE structure
Application program
HiGATE basic program
Boot control
function
(BCF/Vi sta)

White list
File delete
function,
etc.

HDD
encry ption
function

OS(Windows Vista Ultimate)

Hardware (PC‐based with added functions for responding to
attempted access of interior)
3

Figure 1. HiGATE Block Diagram
Table1. Differences between Smart Cards and HiGATE

Difference
OS

IC Card
EMV
specification

Limitation
due to
program
language
development
Memory

Limited

RAM (1
MByte)
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HiGATE
Windows
Vista
Ultimate
Not
limited

RAM (3
Gbytes)
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Table 2. Similarities between Smart Cards and HiGATE

Similarity
Startup of
predetermin
ed program
Memory
cannot be
accessed
externally
False
environmen
t cannot be
created
Tamperresistant
area

IC Card
Read-only
semiconduct
or memory
Encryption
circuit or
single-chip
implementati
on of
memory
Access
controlled by
CPU
Access
controlled by
CPU

HiGATE
BCF/Vista
Case cannot
be opened
with tamperresistant
label
HDD
encryption
・BCF/Vist
a
・HDD
encryption
・Tamper
-resistant
label

4. HIGATE OPERATION
This section describes the HiGATE operation:

①
②
③
④

HiGATE manufacturing phase
Program installation phase
Setting phase
Usage phase.

Persons involved in the above four steps of HiGATE operation include the
manufacturer, program creator, and user.

① Manufacturing phase
The manufacturer preinstalls the OS (Windows Vista) and BCF/Vista
required for HiGATE in the HiGATE PC, and then transfers the HiGATE
system to the program developer.

② Program installation phase
The program developer receives the HiGATE system from the manufacturer,
and loads the processing programs necessary for application into HiGATE.

③ Setting phase
After program installation, the HiGATE system and BCF/Vista are
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configured with the necessary settings. At this time, the program creator
implements the settings with administrator privileges.

(1) BIOS settings
To prevent booting of an OS installed on the PC other than Windows Vista,
“Set the BIOS password” and “Restrict bootable storage to the HDD”
BIOS settings are implemented, and only the program creator knows the
BIOS password.

(2) User account settings
So that the operator cannot operate Windows services and the task scheduler
from the user account that is utilized when operating the PC, the user account
is not given administrator privileges.

(3) Program installation
Controller program files that comprise BCF/Vista, agent program files, and
the white list files are installed. These files are stored on a drive encrypted by
BitLocker (described below), and are set as read-only files that cannot be
overwritten or deleted by the user account.

(4) BitLocker settings
BitLocker is a drive encryption function of Windows Vista Ultimate.
BitLocker is used to encrypt all the drives on an HDD so that an attacker is
unable to remove the HDD from the PC and use another PC to modify the
programs that comprise BCF/Vista.

(5) Windows service settings
Nanshiki Corp.’s sexe freeware was used to register the controller as a
Windows service. This service was registered under the name
MonitoringController (hereafter referred to as MC Service). As a result, the
controller starts up automatically after Windows Vista has started. With this
setting, however, MC Service will not start if the user account is logged in
while in safe mode. Therefore, MC Service information is added to the
Windows registry so that MC Service will start even in safe mode.

(6) Task scheduler settings
The task scheduler is used so that startup occurs when an agent logs into the
user account.
After implementing these six settings, tamper-resistant labels are affixed to all
HiGATE parts that could be opened.

④ Usage phase
The user uses a HiGATE system which has been set up as above. At this
time, a user account that does not have administrator privileges is used by the
user.
These are the phases of HiGATE operation. By allocating the above roles to the
participants involved, the participants can be prevented from performing any
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unauthorized actions. HiGATE users do not possess administrative privileges, and
therefore it would be difficult for them to perform an unauthorized action on the
data. Moreover, since the program creator does not possess the HiGATE system,
it would be nearly impossible for him or her to implement an unauthorized action
on the data handled by the user. Accordingly, none of the participating individuals
are able to perform an unauthorized action on the data used and handled by the
HiGATE system. The prerequisite that the BCF/Vista administrator does not
perform any unauthorized actions is made possible by this system.
5. APPLICATION TO E-DISCOVERY
In this section, the HiGATE system is applied to e-Discovery. The e-Discovery
system described is the “e-Discovery System for Sanitizing Disclosure
Information and for Securing Evidence” [1] proposed by Takatsuka et al.
5.1 e-Discovery
The US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were amended in December
2006 so that in US civil litigation, corporations are obligated to disclose electronic
evidence during the discovery phase held before the start of a civil trial. This
disclosure of electronic evidence is known as e-Discovery [5][6][8]. Figure 2
shows the basic flow of the e-Discovery procedure.
? Retaining
counsel

Plaintiff

? Litigation

Plaintiff’s
attorney

? Keyword
specification
? Retaining
counsel

Defendant

? Data verification

? Data
disclosure

Defendant’s
attorney

? Data collection
(e‐mail, etc.)

Judge

Court
? Submission
of evidence

? Data processing

Forensic consulting company

Key words are selected words
that are highly relevant to the case

E‐Discovery in narrow sense is underlined.

Figure 2. e-Discovery Procedure
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5.2 e-Discovery System Proposed by Takatsuka et al.
First, the plaintiff side provides the defendant side with keywords which relate to
the case. Then, using those keywords, the defendant side discloses files relating to
the case. However, these files may include information such as company secrets
that the company does not want to disclose. As a solution, electronic sanitizing
technology [4] is used. The defendant side completely sanitizes documents that do
not contain keywords, and partially sanitizes documents that contain both
keywords and passages which the company does not want to disclose. This
method permits the disclosure of only the minimum required data. With the
present sanitization technology, however, a keyword may be contained in an area
to be sanitized, and verification thereof is nearly impossible. Takatsuka et al.
solved this problem by encrypting the data contained in a sanitized area. Data that
has been subjected to sanitization with encryption is disclosed to the plaintiff side.
The plaintiff side accepts and verifies the data. At that time, the plaintiff side
verifies that keywords are not contained in sanitized areas.
With this process, however, the decrypted results of sanitized locations may be
unfairly observable. Therefore, a tamper-resistant security device is used so that
interim results cannot be observed, and the HiGATE system is used for this
purpose. Here, a HiGATE system that includes the program part developed for eDiscovery is referred to as HiGATE/e-Discovery.
We developed the minimum needed programs for HiGATE/e-Discovery. The
languages used are C# and C++, and constitute a total of approximately 3,000
steps.
5.3 HiGATE/e-Discovery Operation
This section describes the operation when HiGATE is applied to e-Discovery.
HiGATE is used as a security device at the application site. Application of the
HiGATE system solves the problems of data interference by the plaintiff side and
the slow processing speed associated with smart cards.
1. HiGATE/e-Discovery manufacturing and program loading
The manufacturer transfers the HiGATE system to the program
developer. The program developer loads e-Discovery software into the
HiGATE system. The e-Discovery software program has five functions
for digitally verifying keyword files, decrypting sanitized passages,
verifying whether keywords exist in a decrypted passage, verifying
evidence, and extracting files relating to the case.
2. HiGATE/e-Discovery settings
The HiGATE settings were described in Section 4. e-Discovery
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keywords are also delivered and the plaintiff and defendant sides
exchange public keys.
3. HiGATE/e-Discovery usage
The plaintiff side inputs the data received from the defendant side into
HiGATE/Discovery, and runs the program. This enables the plaintiff side
to verify that keywords are not contained in the sanitized areas. Next, the
plaintiff side reviews only the data related to the case, and moves ahead
with the litigation.
Based on these considerations, the applicability of HiGATE to e-Discovery
appears promising.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed hardware that is equipped with a tamper-resistant
function that cannot be modified by even the hardware owner, has fast I/O
throughput and arithmetic processing speeds; is capable of accumulating large
quantities of data that can be programmed similarly to a PC and can be developed
inexpensively and easily. A prototype was built and the results of an application
of e-Discovery were reported.
The basic HiGATE program developed this time has only minimal functionality,
but we intend to expanded the functionality in the future, and improve the ease-ofuse and safety.
The HiGATE system is suitable for application to situations requiring technology
for proving that an administrator has not accessed files or participated in the
processing. In addition to e-Discovery, the application is thought to be possible in
many other fields, such as data matching in an epidemiologic study.
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